This paper demonstrates that concepts behind five of the six imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine are still relevant to the post-Cold War era. Weinberger's six tests, in addition, are not as restrictive as they appear. Weinberger provides caveats and exceptions in his first five imperatives that allow policy-makers more flexibility in applying his imperatives. All the tests require mature, subjective evaluation by the nation's leaders. The sixth "last resort" imperative, however, implies too much restriction for policy-makers to deal with the complex post-Cold War threat environment. Further, the sixth imperative implies using the instruments of power sequentially rather than simultaneously. This does not optimize the use of all the instruments in concert and can, in fact, cause a policy to fail, as it did in Somalia. As demonstrated by the Clinton Administration's failed policy in Somalia, following the concepts found in the first five imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine could have averted the failure of the TFR mission and subsequently the UNOSOM II mission. In contrast, following the sixth imperative of "last resort," implying sequential rather than simultaneous use of all the instruments of power, could have led to failure. The Clinton Administration formulated PDD-25 to avoid many of the policy mistakes it had made in Somalia. Toward that goal, the Administration incorporated the concepts of five of the six imperatives contained in the Weinberger Doctrine, all be it in much less restrictive language and without the requirement that all of the imperatives be met to commit forces to combat. In PDD-25 the Administration rejected Weinberger's sixth imperative requiring combat forces be used as the "last resort." These imperatives, overall, are not as restrictive and dogmatic as many consider. Policy-makers must still make subjective judgments when evaluating a specific case against that test. The sixth imperative of "last resort" is the most troublesome for policy- makers because it is the most restrictive of all the tests and it implies that the military instrument of power should only be applied sequentially--not simultaneously. This imperative is the least developed and, probably, the most misleading to policy makers. Even with the weakness of the sixth imperative, however, the concepts in the Weinberger Doctrine still provide decision-makers with some concrete, practical guidelines in making inherently subjective decisions. The concepts behind each of the six imperatives serve as a useful complement to the more general FAS test.

ADA 370356 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)