The 1998 revision of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) contains an important new mission for the armed forces of the United States. The failed state is identified as a new threat to the security interests of the United States. The increase in the number of failed states, the permissive intervention environment, and the NSS requirement to stabilize failed states, seem to guarantee the Army will continue to deal with this threat in the future. This monograph evaluated the effectiveness of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) tactical doctrine found in Field Manual 7-98: Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict for military operation within failed states. The monograph utilizes the battle command process to visualize LIC tactical doctrine. FM 7-98 provides tactical level guidance to brigade and battalion commanders and staff officers in planning controlling and coordinating combined operations in a LIC environment. The visualizations are compared against the actual conditions found in failed states and the Army's recent experiences in Somalia and Haiti. The monograph uses the standards for effective doctrine contained in Field Manual 100-5, Operations as its evaluation criteria. The comparisons are analyzed to determine if the current LIC tactical doctrine is an effective tool for battle commanders to exercise battle command in a failed state. The monograph determines that FM 7-98 does not create a shared approach on how to conduct operations and inadequately addresses the requirements for tactical commanders to adapt to the conditions of a failed state. It does, however, provide specific guidance on how to conduct operations in the form of appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures. The monograph recommends that future tactical doctrine should consider a general systems model for describing failed state environments.

ADA 366391 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)