The combined arms training experience that evolved from the doctrinal adoption of the Airland Battle and the series of training doctrinal manuals (FMs 25-100 and 25- 101) provided for the experiential development of combined arms leaders. Training focused on combined arms training and the incorporation of the combined arms force. Operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and resourcing has shifted the focus on collective training above the platoon level to small unit training at the platoon and squad level. This focus is at the expense of the development of company commanders who are proficient in combined arms warfighting. This monograph examines current company combined arms training in selected United States Army Infantry battalions. It answers the question: Is current unit combined arms training preparing company commanders to fight a mid to high intensity combined arms battle? In an effort to focus on the experience pillar of Army doctrinal training, company collective training is examined to determine if company commanders are being prepared to fight a mid to high intensity combined arms battle. The focus is on combined arms live fire exercises, external evaluations, combat training center rotations, sustainment training, and multi-iteration training. Unit training directives and guidance are compared against Army doctrinal training manuals and selected criteria to quantitatively determine the level and extent of unit training. This monograph concludes that company commanders are not being prepared to fight a mid to high intensity combined arms battle. The effects of diminished resources, operations tempo, and Army officer management timelines are effectively preventing the warfighting development of company commanders. This monograph recommends a model training strategy that will help develop the critical skills company commanders require for combined arms warfighting.

ADA 366269 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)