The purpose of this monograph is to examine the relevance of current doctrine for organizing artillery for combat within the context of the changes anticipated by 2025 in the Army After Next. The primary research question is: Will Army After Next technology require a change to the Field Artillery Standard Tactical Missions as the means to organize for combat? This Monograph concludes that a change will be required. By 2025, technological advancements will invalidate the basis on which the current organization for combat doctrine was developed. Significant improvements in munitions and control capabilities will require fundamental reengineering of current doctrine. While it is possible to apply the doctrine of the 90's in 2025 and make it work, doing so would be foolish for this would fail to exploit the capabilities inherent in the forthcoming advanced technology. Standard Tactical Missions are not appropriate for interdependent artillery and maneuver operations. With the anticipated capabilities and combat doctrine changes for the Army After Next, the current system of artillery organization for fails to support interdependent fires. The purpose of current doctrine is designed to organize indirect fire support based upon the support relationship to maneuver. This doctrine lacks an adequate mechanism to assign indirect fires assets a mission separate from maneuver elements. The purpose of current doctrine is not retained in the Army After Next environment so current doctrine must change. Army After Next indirect fires structured using Standard Tactical Missions will not effectively support distributed operations. Significant changes in the fires model will change the conditions that Standard Tactical Missions were developed for. These changes include increased battlefield dispersion, weapons capabilities, command and control. In addition, the transition to effects based doctrine will replace the traditional "weapon-centric" fires doctrine. Standard Tactical Missions will not be relevant in an environment where resources are allocated by effects instead of by platform. Army After Next fires organized using Standard Tactical Missions will not be responsive to the total forces needs. This organizational model is not simultaneously responsive to both the force commander and maneuver subordinate units. Besides limited responsiveness, Standard Tactical Missions prevent utilization of firing platforms at their maximum efficiency because this structure places assets in a hierarchy which "stovepipes" fires requests and coordination. The current organizational structure limits use of fires assets at maximum capacity because of practical difficulties in providing support to units outside of the established hierarchy.

ADA 366300 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)