The objective of this study is to determine if the German "blitzkrieg" and Fall Gelb of 1940 were an expression of operational art. Despite the mythology surrounding Fall Gelb, the campaign does not constitute a major breakthrough in operational art by the Germans. Fall Gelb was not an expression of operational art. This conclusion is based upon an analysis using the approaches posed by U.S. Army and joint doctrine, Dr. James Schneider and Dr. Shimon Naveh. The purpose of this study is to examine more closely what is meant by "operational art" and to use those contemporary insights to reexamine German military operations in France in May 1940, Fall Gelb. Fall Gelb was chosen because it is a campaign that is frequently studied and often used and abused to illustrate various points relating to military operations. The study of the Fall Gelb campaign offers a glimpse of past operations through the lens of contemporary thought. That study provides the contemporary military professional an opportunity to improve his understanding of operational art through the study of a historical campaign. Fall Gelb must be analyzed using criteria derived from a modern understanding of operational art to objectively assess the significance of Fall Gelb. There are three distinctive approaches to operational art. One way to approach the problem is to use contemporary doctrine as a yardstick. Contemporary doctrine approaches the issue by using simple definitions and lists to describe the essential elements of operational art. Another approach is that taken by Dr. James Schneider from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. Schneider's approach seeks to describe the phenomena associated with the practice of Operational Art. Schneider breaks down operational art into key attributes necessary for the practice of Operational Art. A third approach to the issue is that used by Dr. Shimon Naveh, an Israeli military theorist. Naveh's approach focuses on describing the cognitive process he identifies as operational art. These approaches to the subject of operational art offer three different standards by which to measure German military operations. The three approaches share common elements and can be used to produce a set of common criteria for the analysis of Fall Gelb. German operations in 1940 reveal little insight into the elements of operational art. The Germans failed to use a unified and holistic approach in their design, execution, and sustainment of campaigns mostly due to their lack of political-strategic cognition. Hitler's overpowering influence in the operational and tactical levels of war severely limited the German military's operational vision, which is a prerequisite for operational art. Also, the German planners in the OKH and OKW failed to identify a clear sequence of tactical and operational objectives to achieve strategic goals and thus did not practice operational art. The German Officer Corps did not have a "broad and universal" theory of blitzkrieg. There was no consensus within the military as to the operational substance of blitzkrieg. The German's maneuvers lacked industrious relationships between strategic, operational, and tactical actions. The operational design was ambiguous because the planners could see no farther than the tactical success. The High Command hoped that unfolding events would guide their thought for the second phase of Fall Gelb.

ADA 370333 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)