The modern term, creeping into the American lexicon, "Tomahawk Diplomacy" has come to represent a form of limited military response where the National Command Authority (NCA) employs cruise missiles and other high technology weapons as a means of enforcing American foreign policy and protecting U.S. security. Although this form of response normally includes an array of precision weapons and delivery systems, cruise missiles have become a most visible and highly publicized form of limited military response. The NCA relies heavily on cruise missiles as a strategic asset. So predominant are these weapons that cruise missiles are specifically mentioned in both the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy as an integral part of nearly every military response contingency. The U.S. is employing these weapons with increasing regularity and is expected to continue to rely on this form of response in the future. This monograph explores the implications of employing cruise missiles as a means of limited military response in the pursuit of U.S. national security objectives or imposition of U.S. foreign policy. This monograph uses the three most recent U.S. use of cruise missiles as case studies and analyzes them against a defined set of criteria in order to identify the strategic implications of their use. This research uses the instruments of national power as criteria to develop a framework for analysis. Publications from various academic and media sources form the body of knowledge necessary to develop a coherent balance of arguments for and against the use of cruise missile diplomacy. The intent of this monograph is to determine if the use of cruise missiles is restricting limited military response options to operational planners, and provides a framework for identifying and understanding strategic implications. The analysis shows that Tomahawk cruise missiles provide the military with a highly versatile weapon, but because of cruise missile technological capability, political leaders are tempted to use them to achieve a relatively low risk limited strikes in the face of failed diplomacy and nonfunctional foreign policy. Tomahawk cruise missiles themselves do not constrain the operational planner, but the capabilities of cruise missiles allow political leaders to rapidly pursue military options that often include a great deal of political influence in the conduct of the operation. Due to an aversion to sustain US and adversary casualties and an interest in limiting collateral damage, political leaders often place limits and constraints on the military planner. These aversions stem from the fundamental and relative importance of the issue at stake. The limits and constraints imposed by the political leadership hamper the operational planner in developing a comprehensive and effective military response to achieve stated political objectives.

ADA 370390 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)