This monograph examines current Strike Force initiatives and their potential impact. The purpose of this examination is to determine whether, "Are the proposed Strike Force (SF) mission sets applicable to future war scenarios?" The next ten to fifteen years will find the United States Army involved in conflicts that run the full spectrum of conflict. These conflicts will require a force that can quickly respond but has the lethality normally associated with traditional heavy forces. In 1996, TRADOC began the development of a medium weight force, Strike Force that would be able to respond to the challenges of these conflicts. This monograph uses the 1996 book entitled The Next War written by Casper Weinberger and Peter Schweizer as a vehicle to examine the potential applicability of Strike Force. The Next War contains five well-conceived and plausible future war scenarios. The organizational and operational concepts for Strike Force were inserted into these five scenarios where appropriate and implications drawn from them. TRADOC has identified potentially five mission sets that Strike Force will be capable of conducting: Mission Set; (1) High end decisive operations; (2) Entry operations; (3) Peace enforcement; (4) Deter/contain crisis; (5) Humanitarian assistance. The monograph used these five missions as a framework for analysis of the Strike Force applications in The Next War. There were fourteen occurrences of Strike Force being utilized in The Next War. These Strike Force applications were limited to the High-end decisive operations, Entry operations, and Deter/contain crisis mission sets. The study concluded that based on the frequency and diverse applications of Strike Force employment during The Next War scenarios, the Strike Force offers the NCA or regional CINC an additional option. The Strike Force unit would be able to preempt, contain, arrest escalation, or quickly transition to combat operations in lieu of a traditional heavy or light force.

ADA 370343 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)