The Army recognizes that a medium-weight contingency force would be well suited to meet national security requirements for the twenty-first century. This medium-weight force would have an ability to deploy more quickly than heavy armor formations, yet possess more combat power than current light forces. With this vision in mind, force designers set out to build the Strike Force. The problem is that the original vision of a re-equipped standing Strike Force has been cancelled in favor of creating only a Strike Force headquarters that would draw units from across the Army prior to deploying. In an 18 January 1999 interview in Army Times the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer indicated that the rationale for his decision was not the estimated $1.1 billion price tag associated with a standing Strike Force, but rather centered on the desire to build a more adaptable force than would be possible if permanent units were assigned. Analysts have criticized the decision asserting that the Army may not have the right forces or equipment required by the Strike Force. Specifically, several military analysts believe the Strike Force should be equipped with a wheeled vehicle, rather than tracks which is the only type of combat system that exists in the Army. The monograph begins with an examination of the Strike Force concept and the environment in which it is expected to operate. Because any conflict has two sides, the environment is not only considered from an American viewpoint, but also from the view of what threats the organization may face. The advantages and disadvantages of using a wheeled and tracked Strike Force vehicle are derived from this information. The wheeled version is found to have better strategic and operational transportability and enjoys better supportability, while the tracked vehicle would likely have better tactical mobility and be more survivable. Finally, the monograph analyzes these findings with respect to the patterns of operation identified in Army Vision 2010. The wheeled vehicle is greatly favored with respect to projecting the force and sustaining the force, while being only slightly disadvantaged in the remaining criteria. The monograph concludes that analysts were correct in asserting that a wheeled Strike Force combat system would be better than a tracked version.

ADA 370242 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)