The geostrategic and military situation for NATO (and specifically for the FEDERAL REPUBLIC of GERMANY) created in the wake of Germany's reunification and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, has led to revival of the military-strategic principle of counter-concentration under the umbrella of the Alliance's strategic defense. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, dated 7 November 1991, insists on the Alliance's continuing a purely defensive orientation. This implies that NATO forces will never be employed in the context of a strategic offensive, but only used in a strategic defensive role. The principle of military-strategic counter-concentration of MC 400 is the core of NATO's new military strategy. Based to these historical facts, three related processes are having profound effects on the Bundeswehr - the German Federal Armed Forces. First, the ruling of the Constitutional Court relative to the commitment of forces outside of Germany and NATO territory has expanded the range of its possible military missions. Second, a new operational dimension has been created by the prospects for greater integration of the Bundeswehr in multinational formations and more important operations. Third, as policy changes follow these developments, the size and composition of the Bundeswehr are evolving to meet the associated challenges. All of these changes within NATO and the European Union, within the range of potential missions, and within the Bundeswehr itself have influenced German thinking on matters that were, like many other military and political initiatives, frozen by the superpower standoff that began in 1945. Consequently, strategic thinking and the supporting operational concept, reflecting the new strategic situation in Europe are evolving free of Cold War restraints. The effect is a "return to basics" in operational thinking and operational planning. Therefore, a "new" operational thinking started in the German Army in accordance with contemporary German politics, German military history and current strategic and operational planning within NATO, the WEU and the German government. This thinking process is summarized in the German Army under the subject of "FREIE OPERATIONEN" and will have a tremendous influence in organisation, armament planning and leadership programs.

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