The United States Army is currently evolving from its Cold War structure to the more force-projection- oriented army of Force XXI. This transition will be complete by 2010. Beyond Force XXI is the Army After Next (AAN) which is projected to be implemented between 2020 and 2025. The Pentomic Division of the 1950s and the AAN Battle Force concepts appear to have many similarities between them. These similarities include, but are not limited to, non-linear style operations, dependence upon air lines of communications, "island" support concept, ultra reliable vehicles, battle rhythm and reliance upon new technology to support the concept. Both of these concepts tried/try to leverage technology to drive the concept to fruition. With the ultimate failure of the Pentomic Division's ability to conduct continuous combat operations it becomes relevant to compare the two concepts to determine if there are any substantial differences between them which will enhance the AANs probability of success. If there are not any discernable differences between the AAN and Pentomic concepts, is the Army headed down the same path forty years later? The AAN and Pentomic concepts are critically compared against one another using the five basic Tenets of Army Operations of initiative, agility, depth, synchronization and versatility contained in Army Field Manual 100-5, dated 14 June 1993. These concepts are compared to determine which one is most compatible with these tenets. These tenets are recognized Army wide as the keystones to any operation. Analysis reveals that the AAN Battle Force concept better supports the live tenets than the Pentomic Division concept. This monograph comes to three basic conclusions as to why the AAN Battle force concept better supports the tenets. First, the AAN concept has an inherent advantage in the time span of development. Second, the political and social environment has changed significantly since the 1950s and is more conducive to the AAN concept. Third, the design of the AAN concept is more complete and relevant as a warfighting concept.

ADA 366232 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)