This monograph examines the question is Clausewitz' theoretical concept of center of gravity the antithesis of a systems approach to warfare. The nature of conflict has changed since the age of Clausewitz, and a theoretical concept designed to explain war in the Napoleonic era may not be applicable to warfare in the present and future. The monograph examines the theoretical origins of the concept in the context of Clausewitz' time. It examines the string of reasoning that may have led Clausewitz to his postulations on the concept of center of gravity, and why an almost literal translation from Clausewitz' era until the present continues to perpetuate the linear nature of the concept. Modem systems theory rich with applicability to warfare in the information age is contrasted against the linear based Clausewitzian concept. The monograph explains the role of the concept relative to systems shock and reveals how operational planners confuse the issue by mixing concepts creating a doctrinal soup of terms centered around the linear based concept of center of gravity. The monograph concludes with recommendations that if accepted would actually develop concepts that reflect how U.S. forces fight. It would incorporate a new systems based concept of center of gravity as an inductive process; conditions that operational planners and systems thinkers seek to induce into a rival system causing System Shock. This would be counter to the deductive concept currently used and would foster a common understanding among joint forces where none currently exists.

ADA 366222 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)