One week after the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain hit 85 percent of their targets during the four days of Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Iraq again challenged the United States by firing surface to air missiles at aircraft patrolling the no fly zones established after Operation Desert Storm. Iraq's challenge seems to bolster critics' point of view that pinpoint bombing alone cannot achieve the political and military endstates desired by the military or the administration. Critics warn that the Pentagon's costly and ambitious drive to acquire and employ high-tech weapons ignores the political and strategic dimensions of warfare. The Pentagons pursuit of high-tech weapons is guided by "Joint Vision 2010". "Joint Vision 2010" published in early 1996, not only presents a vision of the future but serves as a guide for current and future technical and budgetary decisions. "Joint Vision 2010" is the statement of an envisioned future which will guide the armed forces through its transformation from a twentieth century analogue force to a digital force capable of protecting the interests of United States in the strategic environment of the twenty-first century. "Joint Vision 2010" envisions the transformation of the armed forces will occur through the development and implementation of four new operational concepts, new organizational designs and the fielding and development of advanced weapon systems. This monograph examines two of these new operational concepts, dominant maneuver and focused logistics. These two concepts are examined to determine if the operational concept of focused logistics presented in "Joint Vision 2010" supports the operational concept of dominant maneuver presented in "Joint Vision 2010". The significance of this examination is that the as yet achieved capabilities envisioned in the concept of dominant maneuver are the justification for controversial changes to force structure and long term budgetary decisions. However these capabilities are unattainable if the concept and capabilities of focused logistics do not support them. To examine this question, the monograph compares and contrasts the operational concepts of dominant maneuver and focused logistics as presented in "Joint Vision 2010" against one another. Data collected is summarized in a descriptive comparison of the elements and requirements of the operational concepts of dominant maneuver and focused logistics. The monograph concludes that the capabilities presented in the concept of dominant maneuver are largely the result of the achievement of focused logistics. The monograph cautions against confusing the capabilities set forth in "Joint Vision 2010" with the current realities.

ADA 370321 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)