3D Armored Cavalry Regiment as an operationally significant force.
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3D Armored Cavalry Regiment as an operationally significant force.
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As of Spring 1999, the United States Army continues discussing the design of the Army After Next and the need to create an operationally significant force capable of deploying rapidly, conducting distributed operations using maneuver and firepower, facilitated by information dominance, to destroy enemy forces and to seize and retain ground. Although the creation of a Strike Force organization is being considered, an operationally significant force must be identified in the interim (year 2000-2010). This monograph examines the question: Does the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) possesses the characteristics required to be an operationally significant force? To answer this question this monograph applies three evaluation criteria. First, does the ACR possess the capability to conduct the variety of military actions necessary to accomplish the operational purpose of the military operation? Second, is the ACR capable of deploying quickly enough to a designated theater of operation to create conditions that support the military objective? Lastly, can the ACR logistically support itself for a designated period of time once it arrives in theater? In order evaluate the ACR's characteristics utilizing these three criteria, a near-term scenario based upon the current (1999) situation in Macedonia is created. This monograph concludes that the 3d ACR does not meet the criteria required of an operationally significant force within the context of the given scenario. Although the ACR is capable of deploying to the Macedonia Theater of Operation (MTO) in forty-one days and a logistical support structure capable of sustaining the ACR can be organized, the 3d ACR does not possess the combat and combat support capability necessary to conduct the operational-level mission. Though the ACR contributes a significant portion of the combat capabilities required to achieve the operational purpose of the military operation, its combat support and combat service support needs will definitely require substantial augmentation.
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