The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a significant part of the U.S. Army's planning process. The IPB is a methodical process that reduces the enemy and the environment into its component parts at an instant in time and finite space. At the tactical level, the inductive process allows a commander to develop a plan that focuses his combat power at particular military components that are identified as enemy vulnerabilities. This process has proven quite successful at the tactical level. The IPB process is described to a lesser extent at the operational and strategic levels of war in FM 34-130. The manual states the basic IPB process remains the same, regardless of the level of war at which it is conducted. This argument cannot be valid above the tactical level of war because of the complexity associated with higher level objectives and aims that integrate the instruments of power. This makes predicting one or two likely enemy courses of action at the operational and strategic levels almost impossible. The focus above the tactical level must not be on identifying specific enemy courses of action, but rather enemy centers of gravity, decisive points, and patterns of enemy behavior to develop friendly campaign plans. The monograph proposes establishing a theoretical foundation first and developing a methodology based on the preferred theories. The proposed methodology is evaluated using criteria established by Cohen and Gooch, authors of Military Misfortunes. They suggest that military failures are attributed to organizations that fail to learn, anticipate and/or adapt. The basis of all current U.S. military operations and campaign plans are based on the results of the IPB process. Therefore, these attributes must be integrated into any proposed IPB methodology to be considered successful. A process that does not meet these criteria must be considered fundamentally unsound. These three criteria will formulate the theoretical underpinning in support of the argument and evaluation of the proposed methodology. This monograph analyzes current operations in complex urban terrain by two major technological powers, the United States in Somalia and Russia in Chechnya superimposing the proposed methodology. The monograph analyzes these examples using a proposed methodology. The principle research question is "Is there utility to using system and complexity theory as the framework for the IPB process at the operational level of war?" The monograph concludes that the IPB process in FM 34-130 must be revised above the tactical level. The current inductive IPU process is incapable of understanding complex relationships and identifying patterns of behavior in the complex realm of operational warfare. The monograph proposes a process that is holistic and deductive and is capable of learning about the enemy, anticipating the enemy's actions and provides recommendations to adapt to the behavior.

ADA 370310 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)