The Army After Next concept is a significant part of the U.S. Army's role in future operations. The proponents are developing doctrinal concepts that break current paradigms of multiple battlefield operating systems at the tactical level. The expectation is that technology will simplify and eliminate the need for engineers, air defense, and other forces at the tactical level. The infantryman will assume the responsibility for tasks such as mobility. However, many experts predict the future battlefields will consist of complex urban terrain where much of the world population is occupying. The complexity of the terrain will nullify or reduce a number of the technological capabilities of the future infantryman to accomplish his mission. This monograph explores the lessons learned in current operations in complex urban terrain by two major technological powers, the United States in Somalia and Russia in Chechnya. The monograph identifies the distinct role of the infantryman and the engineer in the urban milieu. The analysis examines the expectations of previous urban conflicts and if the future technologies address the needs for the infantryman to accomplish them. The analysis examines the feasibility of the infantryman performing his mission using three leadership criteria. The criteria includes maintaining proficiency, physical stamina and each soldier's cognitive abilities. The principle research question is "Will technology be the critical enabler that optimizes the urban warrior's performance or are there associated engineer tasks that can be better performed by a specialized engineer enabler to optimize the urban warrior in a complex urban environment?" The conclusions are that the infantryman can accomplish the common mobility tasks in a complex urban terrain with risk. The risks do not consider requirements for innovative solutions and the need for specialist as newer technologies such as robotics develop.

ADA 366250 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)