This paper examines the question whether systems theory, and the concepts of systems-shock and the center of gravity are compatible and have any utility in military planning. Currently there is a debate between systems theory proponents who argue that Clausewitz's center of gravity is obsolete and no longer has any utility in modem warfare. Others argue that not only is the concept of center of gravity still valid, it is the essence of military planning that focuses military effort. The evidence clearly shows that if the current systems-based concept of center of gravity, as defined in joint doctrine, is used, the concepts are compatible. However, if the definition is the traditional Clausewitzian concept, they are not compatible. The historical examples of the Battle of France, Operation Just Cause, and Operation Desert Storm demonstrate this. Systems theory, systems-shock and the center of gravity are not only compatible; they need each other to be of utility. Planners need systems theory, to explain the complex and adaptive nature of modem societies and militaries. They need it to correctly identify and describe centers of gravity and decisive points. Without systems theory, planners would resort to the obsolete, Clausewitzian concept of the center of gravity and attempt to identify the greatest concentration of combat power as the center of gravity. If this concentration existed it would lead to clashes of strength and costly attrition warfare that otherwise might be avoided. Clausewitzian concentrations of power however, rarely exist. Generally modem militaries and societies do not create such obvious targets. They disperse power across various systems and link or network them so they can concentrate power when needed and then rapidly disperse it for survivability. Systems theory explains this linking and networking process and how these linkages and enabling systems can become centers of gravity or decisive points. Therefore without systems theory, planners will look for Clausewitzian centers of gravity that may not exist. The systems-based concept of center of gravity and decisive points are essential tools of campaign design. The systems-based concept of center of gravity maintains its ability to focus military effort on identifiable systems or capabilities and to neutralize those systems or capabilities, thus removing the enemy's means of resistance. Like a magnifying glass, the center of gravity concept focuses military energy into an intense effort directed at the enemy's centers of gravity or decisive points and prevents dispersion and wasted effort. Thus the center of gravity remains a valid and powerfull tool for military planning. Systems theory and systems-shock also need the concept of center of gravity. Without the center of gravity, systems theory would be a descriptive theory with no practical utility. The center of gravity concept gives systems theory a practical military application. The center of gravity and decisive points provide a means to focus systems-shock. Without the center of gravity concept to focus systems-shock, military resources could be wasted in futile efforts. Because the historic examples show that there is compatibility between the modern systems-based concept of center of gravity, systems theory, and systems-shock, the debate should end.

ADA 366263 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)