Since January 1999, there has been a tremendous level of debate within the U.S. Army concerning how it should be organized and how it should deploy, specifically, its ability to rapidly deploy within 96 hours and provide a deterrence force of two to five thousand personnel. Army advocates for change argue that the Army's current force structure consists of heavy mechanized forces and light airborne forces, but no medium-weight, rapidly deployable, ground force capability that can perform a multi-mission role. This role should cover a wide spectrum to include decisive combat and operations other than war, specifically support and stability operations. In order to bridge this gap, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has been designated the proponent to develop a rapidly deployable medium-weight force, its name, Strike Force. As the proponent, TRADOC has developed a Strike Force Operational and Organizational Concept - a concept that has recently been approved by General Reimer, Army Chief of Staff. Many critics challenge the validity of the Strike Force concept, as the need for this capability has appeared to materialize from nowhere. Those critics have brought to the forefront several fundamental questions, such as, what are the operational requirements, purpose, and mission of such a force? Is there a current shortfall regarding the Strike Force concept within the Department of Defense in general and within the U.S. Army in specific? Would the establishment of such a force be redundant with current Army or other service capabilities? Does the Army envision a requirement to change its methods of force tailoring and organizing forces for operations in order to meet the dynamic needs of emerging and future operational requirements? This monograph explores the viability of the Strike Force concept in terms of the U.S. Army's current and future mission requirements. The evaluation criteria identified for this monograph has been designed to assess the requirement for a Strike Force capability within the U.S. Army. More specifically, evaluation criteria has been based upon data assembled from several secondary sources to include current Army mission statements and functions, the Army Universal Task List (AUTL), Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010, and the five goals of the Army After Next (AAN) Modernization Plan. Also, the method of establishing a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and the Marine Corps Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF). Headquarters concept served as evaluation criteria to validate the organizational methodology and headquarters structure of the Strike Force O&O concept. The monograph concludes that the Army's Strike Force Organizational and Operational Concept is valid and should be explored further as outlined in United States Army Posture Statement Fiscal Year 2000. The monograph also identifies several recommendations Strike Force planners must consider in the further development of the Strike Force O&O Concept.

ADA 370344 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)