This monograph discusses surprising the enemy through the use of deception during air assault operations. It focuses at the tactical level of war. Its purpose is to explore whether or not there are tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be used to deceive the enemy as to where the helicopters are going. Brief investigation has revealed that deception is not used often at Combat Training Centers and that the loss of surprise is the single most devastating cause of poor performance of air assault units. This monograph first examines doctrine and theory. It concludes that doctrine is available, but with few practical examples. Theory supports surprise as a goal during all operations, but theorists support varying levels of commitment to the use of deception to attain surprise. The author concludes that in light of today's improved air mobility each theorist considered would support the use of deception during air assault operations. After reviewing the doctrine and theory the monograph reviews several historical examples from World War II and Vietnam. Operation BERTRAM, which occurred in North Africa, D-day, and Corregidor are several of the operations reviewed. Operations reviewed from Vietnam include JUNCTION CITY and CEDAR CREEK. The principle finding is that deception is a valuable part of the art of war during air assault operations. The vulnerabilities of helicopters and their thin skinned cargo makes surprise essential to the reduction of casualties, equipment loss, and risk. History gives us numerous examples of tactics, techniques, and procedures for using deception to gain surprise. This monograph provides an air assault planner with several methods that have proven successful in deceiving the enemy as to where the helicopters are going. Essentially, they allow a planner to hide the helicopters.

ADA 366189 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)