This thesis examines the initial effort to formulate principles for information- based operations. Although it is impossible to explore each aspect of this transformation, it is worthwhile to examine current efforts by the US military to develop a doctrinal foundation for Information Operations (IO). It explores the ongoing struggle to capture within the confines of Joint military doctrine those critical features of this "new age driven by information". The world community is increasingly dependent on reliable information traffic. Information has become a commodity and source of power unto itself. Alvin Toffler describes this period as the transformation of societies from 'second-wave' (industrial/mechanical) to 'third-wave' (information-based) means. The growing dependence of the US military on these infrastructures reveals potentially vulnerable elements of the National Information Infrastructure (NII). This monograph examines the need for a comprehensive IO doctrine. It yields a critical analysis of existing doctrine, illuminates several flaws within the current construct, and concludes with a suggested model for IO development. Doctrinal models are developed for the Army, Air Force, and Navy respectively. These models explain those aspects which most essentially describe the 'doctrinal culture' of each service component. These factors include: service organization; employment of forces (both in peace and during crisis); and methods of control. In turn, each component model is compared to the revised IO model. Current IO doctrine provides little in the way of enduring principles and mistakenly incorporates a narrow range of offensive options. IO principles should follow the 'cultural perspective' found within present naval doctrine (a service whose doctrinal development is also at its genesis). A reformulation of the basic IO tenets is necessary to produce doctrine which is adaptive, useful, and appropriate, both in peace and in war.

ADA 381827 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)