This monograph examines how the corps planning organization transitions in the corps-to-JTF contingency operation scenario. The research question of the monograph is, "Should the corps form the separate planning elements of the J35, future operations, and the J5 future plans, in the corps-to-JTF contingency operation scenario." The monograph determines that the corps-based single planning organization model, as employed by the XVIII Airborne Corps, possesses the requisite competencies and efficiencies so as not to require the formation of two planning elements. The first part of the monograph examines the corps. It examines its mission, role, and staff organization. It continues by specifically examining the corps planning organization and procedures in detail. This doctrine and SOP based review determines the planning competencies of the corps planning organization. This research determines that the critical corps planning competencies include a combined operational and tactical level planning proficiency, the ability to plan across the time and event horizon (near-term/branch and long-term/sequel), and planning joint and interagency supporting integration. The next part of the monograph researches the JTF. It considers its mission, role, and staff organization. It continues by specifically examining the JTF's planning organization and procedures in detail. This doctrinal review determines that the JTF staff possesses the same planning competencies and capabilities of any joint staff, since joint doctrine does not differentiate between levels of joint staffs. It also determines that the JTF planning competencies include a complete operational-level planning capability, an ability to plan across the time and event horizon, and the ability to achieve unified action in planning joint, interagency, and multinational integration. Finally, the monograph analyzes the research and evaluates it against the criteria of similarity of required competencies and staff planning effectiveness. The examination of these criteria answers the research question. The determination of this research is that the corps should not automatically form the separate planning elements of the J35 and J5. The monograph concludes and provides two recommendations. First, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures should include an example of the single planning cell model, discussing its strengths and weaknesses. Second, the Combined Arms Directorate should reexamine and reevaluate the proposal to adopt the joint two-element planning organization for Corps XXI.

ADA 389816 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)