Before World War II, the U.S. had only negligible involvement in Asia. However, the defeat of the Japanese, the need to provide assistance to former European colonies and the perceived need to prevent the spread of Communism, left the U.S. as the major power in the region militarily, diplomatically and economically. As the fear of Communist expansion increased in the region, the U.S. extended its containment policy from Europe to Asia and signed a series of security alliances with Asian nations in the early 1950s to enhance regional security and prevent the rise of a unified, Communist Sino-Soviet monolith. This policy of containment with respect to China only began to change in 1969 as President Richard M. Nixon's Administration initiated a rapprochement. President James E. Carter's Administration completed the process in 1979 by recognizing Mainland China as the legal government of China to include Taiwan. Further requirements to contain the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 with its internal collapse. With the end of the Soviet Union, the U.S. began reducing American forces in the region by roughly eleven percent from 1991 to 1995. The intent was to begin transferring security responsibilities to U.S. Allies in the region. Only President William J. Clinton's promise in 1995 to maintain 100,000 military personnel in Asia prevented a further reduction of forces. However, today the U.S. is again continuing to shift the responsibility for Asia's security to its regional Allies, an example being Australia. In July 2000, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen called on Australia to take the lead in formulating policies regarding instability...in the region. This is a result of the changing strategic balance following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Asian economic crisis, and U.S. military constraints in manpower and budget. In light of a decade of change in Asia with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, military budget and manpower constraints, and the changing U.S. global priorities, the monograph examines whether it is in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia. The monograph uses two criteria from the 1999 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) to answer the question: Protection of the physical territory of the U.S. and that of its Allies and friends, and continued stability in regions where the U.S. has a sizable economic stake. Although the NSS does not define protection of friends as a national interest, the author also examines the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan is not a formal treaty Ally, but the U.S. has involved itself, directly or indirectly, with Taiwan's security since 1950. The monograph has five chapters. Chapter one provides the reader an historical examination of U.S. involvement in Asia and explains why the U.S. currently has forward deployed military forces in the region. Chapter two explores what U.S. territories are in the region and who are the U.S. Allies. Chapter three answers the question whether the U.S. requires forward deployed forces to protect its physical property and that of its Allies. Chapter four answers the question whether U.S. forward deployed forces are necessary in a region where the U.S. has a large economic stake. Chapter five summarizes the analysis and answers the monograph question: Is it in U.S. national interests to maintain forward deployed military forces in Asia? The chapter also provides recommendations on a new force structure for the region based on the analysis.

ADA 390482 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)