This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design against an asymmetrical threat during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The focus is on conceptual elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Effective campaign execution is dependent, in part, on effective campaign design that set of theoretical and doctrinal precepts that define the concerns of the operational planner. The monograph identifies lessons learned from this period that are applicable to current U.S. Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of U.S. military action under the American system of civilian control of the military. First, the monograph demonstrated the complex nature of asymmetric warfare. Finding and creating vulnerabilities and attacking those vulnerabilities with inherent strengths is the key to asymmetric warfare. Secondly, the monograph discussed the elements of campaign design that are derived from theory, which incorporate the particulars of military history to the general truth of warfare. Some of the more common conceptual actions are to understand the type and scope of conflict, define the enemy and friendly center of gravity, identify possible culminating points, select lines of operation, determine decisive points, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cybershock. The third section identifies the strategy and identifies particular military objectives identified by the North Vietnamese. The monograph offered three different assessments. The first assessment was how the U.S. was an asymmetric threat to the PAVN and Vietcong. This assessment was based of strategic asymmetry using the forms of asymmetry that are method, will, and patience. The method that both opponents selected to fight the war is what caused the U.S. to be asymmetric to the PAVN and Vietcong. The second assessment was an assessment of the Tet Offensive to see if it contained some of the essential elements of campaign design. The Tet Offensive did contain some of the more common conceptual actions which were to define the center of gravity, determine decisive points, select lines of operation, and understanding the dangers of paralysis commonly known as cybershock. The third assessment was of the effectiveness and efficiency of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) planning and execution using Naveh's criteria. The North Vietnamese's plan responded positively to the following criteria: first, it reflected the cognitive tension, transpiring from the polarization between the general orientation towards the strategic aim and the adherence to the tactical missions. Secondly, the planned action was synergetic. The monograph concludes that an organization needs to stop viewing and presenting asymmetry as a negative thing. Organizations need to exploit asymmetries by creating their own asymmetries depending on the enemy's posture and situation. They need to design and coordinate operations and campaigns of strategic significance with a view of attaining a single strategic aim.

ADA 389402 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)