The Coalition's success in Iraq will be defined by how well it balances the strategy of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) against the realistic requirements for post-conflict reconstruction operations. There are many questions posed about how the Department of Defense and the U.S. Army will approach post-conflict operations and reconstruction in light of their current Department of Defense strategy of RDO. Central Command's commander General Tommy Franks and his subordinate commanders are the test-bed and will determine the concept's true validity. The Cold War's end, coupled with the 11 September 2001 attacks, illustrates the changes to the strategic norms and paradigms in which military operates. As a result, the Department of Defense's civilian and military leadership have initiated programs to transform the military in order to meet these challenges. Addressing these challenges, the services must not only change the way they think, but also their force structure and capabilities in order to adapt quickly to new threats and unexpected circumstances. At the center of transformation is the RDO strategy. The RDO strategy is relevant to the discussion of post conflict operations in that it dictates a war- fighting vision spanning the spectrum of conflict. As such, RDO will affect future military doctrine and structure. In theory, RDO will impact military capabilities in a manner that creates a war-fighting architecture that limits an opponent's options, his range of possible decisions, and rendering his actions more predictable and easier to counter. This monograph examines the U.S Army's doctrine and structure in terms of producing the effects required in a post conflict reconstruction environment. The criteria used to assess these capabilities are derived from the sub-elements residing in the Security pillar as documented in the Reconstruction Framework, published as a joint project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). This framework defines a total of four pillars that must be addresses during any reconstruction effort; these pillars are Security, Justice and Reconciliation, Social and Economic Well-Being, and Governance and Participation. This study uses a methodology that starts by introducing the thesis, and definings the criteria. Following the introduction is an explanation of the terms relating to RDO and post- conflict reconstruction. Next, a historical case study of Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama offer an opportunity to combine the criteria and terminology to illustrate the effects of RDO on post-conflict reconstruction. The fourth chapter provides an RDO based evaluation of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM combat operations. Even with a strategy that focuses on information dominance, command and control, and effects based operations, a dramatic military victory merely defeats the enemy; it does not shape or win the peace. The fifth chapter evaluates post-conflict Iraqi security operations in regard to the social, economic, and political environment. Given a post-Saddam reconstruction setting, the study illustrates challenges that disarmament, as well as protection of borders, the populace, and key political and economic institutions pose to an RDO strategy. This chapter demonstrates that the post-conflict period will last longer and is not fully accounted for within the current RDO strategy. The final chapter examines the future of RDO as comprehensive military strategy. Herein, are recommendations to operational level planning staffs and commanders for force design and employment in support of future post-conflict reconstruction operations.

ADA 419874 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)