Phase III Operation Iraqi Freedom has shown our military's propensity to focus on major combat operations (MCO) often at the expense of post-MCO security and reconstruction. Without clear doctrinal guidance of how to establish effective security in a post-MCO environment, small unit leaders are forced to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures on the spot, thus leaving little time to plan and procure the recourses and measures necessary to establish a fully secure environment. This monograph examines what basic security requirements are necessary to effectively transition from a MCO to a post-MCO environment. A post-MCO environment is a complex environment requiring immediate attention and assistance. Successfully winning the peace and convincing the indigenous population that US and Allied forces are victorious is greatly dependant on the US ability to provide security, promote law and order, restore services, and allow the population to return to work and provide for their families. Political and military understanding of these requirements are paramount to the success of the operation. In most cases, MCO security tasks differ significantly from post-MCO security tasks. Historical analysis can greatly assist in identifying positive and negative trends in post-MCO environments across the political, military, social, economic, infrastructure, and information spectrum. Specifically, Post WW II Germany and Japan, Panama and Kosovo show trends that are inevitable, but can be leveraged if foreseen and prepared for. The trends identified through historical analysis can then be compared to existing US Army doctrine to see if they indeed can affect these trends in a favorable way. Detailed examination identifies gaps between post-MCO requirements and current security doctrine. A security framework addressing these shortfalls provides an effective construct for additional doctrinal research. This monograph recommends specific additions to the current US Army doctrine that can easily implemented.

ADA436142 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)