The purpose of this monograph is to analyze the U.S. Army battlefield distribution system from a "Systems Thinking" perspective. The method involves a holistic analysis of the distribution systems as it functions within its environment. Because identification of patterns and anomalies is an important aspect of Systems Thinking, the subject matter of this monograph reaches beyond Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to historical precedent. Whether for tomorrow, or the more distant future, the object is to discover the leverage points within the system that will help the U.S. Army avoid repeating the logistics shortcomings of OIF. To shed some historical light on the current problem with U.S. Army distribution, this monograph examines the German Army's attempt at solving an identified battlefield distribution problem during the interwar period (1919 - 1939). The solution employed by the German Army was based on the assumption that a quick and decisive victory could substitute for sustained logistic support. This assumption was a major error, and in the case of Operation Barbarossa, it proved fatal. Like the German Army of 1919-1939, the U.S. Army also identified and attempted to solve the challenges of battlefield distribution during its own interwar period. In the years between the Persian Gulf War and the present conflict in Iraq, the U.S. Army instituted a new logistics distribution system based on a successful business practice called "Just In Time" (JIT). The U.S. Army's version of JIT was called Velocity Management or VM, and it initially seemed very promising. Unfortunately, when VM was put to the test during OIF, it failed to overcome the distribution problems that necessitated its creation. Thus, despite a massive effort since the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. Army still has a battlefield distribution problem. According to the U.S. Army's top logistician, LTG Claude V. Christianson: Today's Army is not able to respond rapidly and precisely when support requirements are identified. We do not have the battlefield distribution system that we need. We cannot provide time definite delivery schedules, and we cannot effectively control physical movements across the new battle environment. One of the main reasons for the failure of VM is that like the German Army solution f 1919-1939, it is implicitly based on the assumption that victory will be quick and decisive. Thus, as the U.S. Army address the challenges of the current distribution problem, it must employ a methodology that ensures it does not assume away the logistical realities of the current and future operational environment. To assist in this endeavor, this monograph explores Peter M. Senge's "System Thinking" perspective. The intent is to apply his methodology to analyze U.S. Army battlefield distribution. By utilizing a "Systems Thinking" approach to search for patterns, and of relationships both internal and external to the distribution system, rather than snapshots of events, one is able to recognize feedback loops within the system itself. These patterns, when viewed within the context of space and time (dynamic complexity), present leverage points that afford effective and lasting solutions to the battlefield distribution problem.

ADA436133 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)