The United States once again demonstrated its capability to defeat any nation state's military forces as evidenced by the actions of the Joint Forces of the United States in the decisive victory in Iraq. However once again, we see that the decisive phase of the campaign was not the Major Combat Operation but the follow on Stability and Reconstruction Operation. The United States has won the battle to replace the regime in Iraq but the outcome of the war to establish a stable and pro-liberty regime remains a question as of this time. The Members of Congress and others are asking questions as we complete the task in Iraq and continue to fight the Global War on Terror. Chief among the questions is the one that deals with the Army's structure and organization. The question of the best structure for Stability and Reconstruction Operations has sparked the debate on the best way for the Army to proceed in the Global War on Terror. There are two schools of thought: first, the Army should dedicate a portion of its forces to execute Stability and Reconstruction Operations, while the second, argues the Army should, through modularity, increase the capability of the total force to conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations. The Army Chief of Staff (CSA) stood up Army Focus Area Stability Operations to review the arguments, provide the Army Staff with an overview, and offer a solution based on independent study and comprehensive in its process. The author participated in Task Force Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations and this paper documents the process that was used to consider the question of, "What is the most appropriate force structure for the Army as we continue to execute Stability and Reconstruction Operations"? In this monograph, two opposing perspectives are examined and assessed. The idea that the Army should dedicate a portion of its forces to Stability and Reconstruction Operations and the idea that the Army should make itself more capable through modularity and maintain a general purpose force. The author argues that the most appropriate solution is a full spectrum general-purpose force and not a dedicated special purpose force. The theoretical model used in this paper and developed by Task Force Stability and Reconstruction Operations allows the reader to frame the relationship between the elements of national power and the spectrum of operations. An assessment of each proposal along lines of operation and measures of effectiveness argues for the author's conclusion and recommendation. The author concludes the document by suggesting areas that require further study and recommendations for the Army's way ahead as it determines the most appropriate structure to conduct Stability and Reconstruction Operations.

ADA436112 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)