After toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein in a few weeks, the decisive operational maneuver victory was not enough to defeat the enemy's will to fight. Instead of challenging US forces in a conventional military battle, the enemy has now sought an asymmetrical fight through the use of suicide bombers, kidnappings, beheadings and improvised explosive devices in order to wear down US resolve. This monograph ascertains what is needed to completely defeat the enemy. More importantly, the monograph argues that when the Soviet Union dissolved, the military and policy makers should have recognized the paradigm shift in warfighting, which could lead in our quest for a total war solution without a nuclear exchange. Carl von Clausewitz, in his monumental work, On War, stated that in order to defeat an enemy, a military force must destroy both his means and his will to resist. Destroying an enemy's means to resist is quantifiable and can be done through superiority in numbers, firepower and attrition. However, defeating an enemy's will to resist is not measurable and cannot be guaranteed through superior firepower or strength. Therefore, victory in war can be measured by not only how much of an enemy's means to resist is destroyed, but also by how much his will to resist is shattered. Over the past century with the killing efficiency of modern weapons exponentially increasing, theorists have relied on technology to not only destroy the enemy's means to fight, but also ultimately defeat his will as well. Giulio Douhet pioneered the theory of Strategic Bombing by arguing that the aerial bombardment of an enemy's cities would terrorize and ultimately break the enemy's will to fight. Recently, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the theory of "Shock and Awe" was based upon a sudden, technologically superior firepower display, which would lead to the enemy realizing that resisting would be completely futile. Although the theories of defeating an enemy's will to resist through the use of technology are quite attractive, the reality of war always seems to prove those theories flawed. Unconditional surrender was a policy used by the Allies in order to ensure the complete defeat of the Axis powers. Although decried by critics that it prolonged conflict and increased the number of war casualties, it was founded in the correct notion that a more lasting peace can only be achieved by defeating the will of the people to resist. This ultimately led to the occupation of both Germany and Japan. The cost associated with lengthy occupations was acceptable because World War II was a total war, which this country fought on the primary justification of national survival. Therefore, completely defeating an enemy and occupying his land have been associated with total war. Since World War II, the United States has engaged in various conflicts that have been limited in nature. Max Boot argues in his book, The Savage Wars of Peace, that these limited wars are fought for the reasons of pacification, protection, punishment, or profiteering. Therefore, the United States has never engaged in these limited wars with the purpose of defeating an enemy's will to resist. Concurrently, after the Soviet Union acquired the atomic bomb in 1949, the United States believed that the next total war would be nuclear. Throughout the Cold War, the United States had embraced such concepts as Mutually Assured Destruction, massive retaliation, containment, and détente. After the Vietnam experience and the results of the Yom Kippur War, the US military leadership focused on creating a well trained and equipped force that could effectively defend against a conventional Soviet attack in the plains of Europe. Defeating an enemy's will to resist and occupying his land was something that the Soviets would attempt in Afghanistan, while the focus of the United States revolved around Active Defense and containing the Communist threat to the eastern side of the Berlin Wall. Therefore, defeating an enemy's will to resist was not something that warranted consideration during the struggle between the nuclear armed Superpowers. This monograph concludes that currently in Iraq, the United States is seeking a total war solution with a limited war force structure and mindset. The US is attempting to defeat the enemy's will to resist without the sustained passion of the people and without the total focus of the government. In order to achieve the desired results in Iraq, interagency coordination must be strengthened. The US military can solely and successfully conduct Phase III of an operation, which focuses on destroying the enemy's means to resist. However, Phase IV must be an interagency process if the US seeks to defeat an enemy's will to resist. Simultaneously and completely synchronized, the US must use all elements of national power to destroy an enemy nation's military and regime, build up their economy, government, national institutions and local security, and maintain their infrastructure and their cultural identity. This can only be accomplished through the collaboration of the various agencies of the US government.

ADA435941 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)