Joint air mission commanders and time sensitive targets.
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Joint air mission commanders and time sensitive targets.
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Innovations in command and control procedures for joint air operations have been unable to keep pace with changes in technology and military requirements. Current U.S. operational capabilities often fail to meet the need to task, re-task, and approve strikes against increasingly prevalent mobile, easily camouflaged targets. Networked information systems hold promise for easing the difficulties presented by time sensitive targets (TSTs). However, without improvements in command and control, technological tools may exacerbate the friction of war rather than alleviate it. The current joint air operations command and control structure for strikes against TSTs centralizes too many decisions which, in turn, reduces the flexibility of the air strike package and often leads to mission failure. However, it may be possible in many circumstances, through the use of modern automation and networked information systems, to decentralize decision making. Strike packages are led by air mission commanders. Decentralizing decision making to the air mission commander through the use of network centric warfare (NCW) technologies may be the means to shorten the TST kill chain. Current air mission commander training and qualification is not established in doctrine and the instructions that exist do not address the types of decisions a true joint air mission commander would face. A review of the current doctrine and operational procedures for attack of TSTs revealed unrealized decision-making potential in the form of a joint air mission commander. By reviewing existing requirements for time sensitive attacks and the joint air operations procedures for planning and executing such attacks, this study observed that the air mission commander was in a position to make important tactical and operational decisions but he possessed neither the training nor the authority to do so. From this conclusion, it followed that changes are needed in joint air doctrine, air mission commander training, and air command and control systems to exploit NCW capabilities and to provide more effective attack of TSTs.
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