The art and science of military intelligence analysis has been scrutinized for its accuracy and value since the beginning of warfare. With every advance in technology and information processing, the delta between the trained cognitive capabilities of analysts and the data they collect has widened. In recent history, intelligence operations and training have more often than not focused on automated tools and processes, but very few efforts have been made to measurably improve the reasoning abilities of intelligence analysts and leaders. Now, when faced with modern day adaptive and complex asymmetric threats, the need for human analysis has risen to the forefront, but Army Intelligence is ill equipped to deliver what commanders and consumers need at the tactical and operational levels. In order to effectively answer the question of what core competencies Army intelligence analysts need to meet the contemporary needs of commanders, a survey of doctrinal requirements must first be performed. Amongst doctrine the term predictive intelligence is used frequently to identify what analysts must do to support commanders, but no definition is readily available in the Joint or Army lexicon. Once a definition is established it is applied to the contemporary operating environment from whence an understanding of reasonable commander's needs is separated from unrealistic wants. Thus the purpose and vantage point of this study is cemented and the analysis can proceed. To understand what changes in doctrine and training might be necessary to meet commanders needs, an understanding of the recent evolution of Army analytic training for both enlisted soldiers and officers must be conducted. A crosswalk between doctrine, doctrinal training requirements, and recent training practices is performed to analyze how prediction has been addressed in past training and why it has proven to be inadequate to meet the needs of commanders. The essence and nature of prediction in war is then examined in detail and the analysis leads to the necessity of both redefining practical doctrine and to establishing a core set of competencies for all analytic skill sets in the Army. To aid in doing so, an examination of the larger Intelligence Communities' model for intelligence analysts is conducted and a set of common core competencies is proposed. The findings of the study are that the term prediction does not adequately or realistically address what analysts in all grades must do to meet the reasonable needs of commanders in the contemporary operating environment. The use of this term in current doctrine is nebulous and a more precise understanding of what commanders need from the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System must be established. Army intelligence analysis doctrine is outdated and needs immediate revision. The never published 2000 version of Draft FM 34-3 is a considerable improvement over previous versions but is still inadequate to institute analytic change in units or training centers. Finally, no comprehensive common set of core competencies exists across the analytic disciplines in Army Intelligence that serves to guide its responsibilities to commanders, training, or links it to practices in the larger National Intelligence Community. The concluding recommendations advance the necessity of better defining in doctrine and training manuals what intelligence analysts need to do to meet the contemporary needs of commanders and intelligence consumers. It suggests immediately publishing a revised FM 2-33.4, Intelligence Analysis, to reflect the skills necessary to forecast adversary and threat actions. Additionally, adopting a Army tailored version of a proposed model of intelligence analyst core competencies is recommended and several proposals are made to both transform analytic training and to strengthen intelligence sections, analysts, and leaders.

ADA435988 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)