One goal of the United States (US) is a capabilities-based joint force designed to quickly achieve success along the continuum of conflict ranging from peace operations to war.' In support of this goal, US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) authors crafted an integrated Joint Operational War-fighting (JOW) on 15 August 2002. This concept based upon emerging "Effects-Based Operations" (EBO) and Rapid Decisive Operations" (RDO) concepts. The JOW concept desires a quick and decisive solution, one in which the enemy submits to a rapid strike of superior joint force against critical nodes of an opponent. This concept of using overwhelming power to be decisive is not new -it reflects our US military culture. Consequently, the question to ask is "what is different?" One thing that is different about the emerging RDO concept is the growing belief and acceptance that enhancements in information technology will enable joint planners to rapidly assess and rapidly adapt plans to correspond to changing situations. As a result, the JOW concept suggests that commanders and staffs at the operational level can quickly gain situational awareness and thus develop solutions to operational problems faster than the enemy thus rendering the enemy's actions more predictable and easier to counter. Is this working hypothesis valid? Will decisions for employment of combat power based on more information, quickly shared among more services and agencies enable the US military to rapidly and decisively defeat its opponent? This monograph examined the soundness of RDO concept for full -spectrum operations at the operational level of war? Using "friction" as an overarching evaluation criterion, this paper first determined that the concept's definition is imprecise and can create confusion. Second, it determined the concept's suitability for full-spectrum operations is suspect. There are clearly many situations where the US military is called upon to not rapidly win decisively but rather the US employs its military force to support diplomacy, or conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks. In short, this monograph determined that the military expediency of rapidly employing overwhelming force might be politically unsupportable or physically unachievable. The concept's published focus on the rapid employment of overwhelming combat power in small- scale contingencies potentially masks its universal applicability challenges. The RDO concept is not a sound full spectrum tool for the operational level of war. It should be rewritten.

ADA 419848 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)