The central question of this monograph is a simple one: does the Army's current imagery (IMINT), and measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT) surveillance architecture, at echelons division and below, meet the requirements for supporting military operations in urban terrain? A review of the research leads one to believe that the answer to that question is "no." The monograph considers this question by examining three of the world's larger population agglomerations: Bogoth, Colombia; Lagos, Nigeria; and Seoul, Korea. These urban areas are examined in order to develop three archetype cities: one essentially horizontal (Lagos), one essentially vertical (Seoul) and one that contains many of the elements of the other two (Bogoth). This examination allows the identification of unique requirements, opportunities, and limitations that affect the Army's ability to conduct imagery and measurement and signatures intelligence operations at echelons division and below. The importance in identifying these items is found in an increasingly unpleasant reality of the modern age--the desire to avoid combat urban operations will not be sufficient in itself to avoid such combat. Increasing urbanization on every continent makes it clear that future operations--either combat, humanitarian assistance or any combination of the two--will have some elements of the deployed force operating in complex urban areas that present characteristics markedly different from those present in more traditional military venues. The conclusions drawn are obvious, urban operations raise complex challenges and the Army's current capabilities are not up to meeting those challenges. The picture is not necessarily gloomy; the means to develop the required capabilities exists. It only takes the will to do so. The monograph's recommendations describe the existing capabilities that need to be enhanced to give the Army the ability to effectively support full-spectrum operations within the joint operational area. While full spectrum operations are conducted across all three levels of war, the emphasis in this monograph is on intelligence and surveillance assets that are optimized to support the critical tactical mission that lead to the accomplishment of operational-level objectives. It is at this level where the actions of planners and operational artists, commanders, and staffs are translated into discrete results. The Army can be most effective in achieving the desired results if it provides its lower echelon organizations with the tools that are effective in performing the six intelligence tasks currently described in its basic intelligence doctrinal manual, FM 34-1, Fundamentals of Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. These six tasks-- intelligence and warning, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, situation development, target support and support to targeting, force protection, and battle damage assessment--define the broad sets into which any intelligence or surveillance function can be placed. These tasks also provide a cogent framework in which to assess the Army's current strengths and weaknesses, to allow the necessary objective assessments to be made.

ADA 419915 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)