The United States military is adapting itself to fight warfare in the Information Age, preparing forces that use information superiority as a key weapon. Advocates of this communication-based and information-based form of warfare use the term "Network-Centric Warfare" to describe the new paradigm. This new form of warfighting is expected to fully exploit the power of shared information and superior communications. Both of the recent "Joint Vision" documents, Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020, embrace this new form of warfare as a central feature of the future of the US military. But does Network-Centric Warfare significantly alter operational design of a campaign? Network-Centric Warfare is essentially warfare that generates combat power by effectively linking (networking) actors, sensors, and decision-makers. Shimon Naveh's definition of a campaign (as the competition of two competing complex systems) helps frame the context and relevance of Network-Centric Warfare. Given this context, one cannot underestimate the central importance of the sensor network to the overall effectiveness of the networked force. A campaign planner must consider the abilities and limitations of his sensor network as he plans the campaign, and design appropriate actions accordingly. Additionally, the campaign planner must carefully balance dispersion and mass to counter erosion of forces and sustain operational momentum. A campaign plan must contain the right balance of Network-Centric Warfare and traditional means to attain operational objectives. Since Operation Desert Storm, the joint services have gradually achieved partial networking, which exhibits many of the anticipated features of Network-Centric Warfare. Communications and information system capabilities are enabling geographically dispersed operations, collaboration among key agencies and leaders, and reachback to distant resources. Joint forces now employ adaptive and persistent sensor networks, although limitations persist in what these sensors can realistically achieve. The sensor network is highly integrated with fires, and is regarded as an integral enabler of effects and maneuver. Ground units are gaining the ability to dominate expanded battlespace, and integrate fully into the networked force. Finally, network-centric capabilities are increasing the operational reach and synergy of each service's forces. Network-Centric Warfare is now a key element of modern campaign design. Network-centric operations permit the use of widely dispersed forces across an expanded battlespace, but there is a balance needed between dispersion and mass needed for operational momentum. Sensor networks are now essential for network-centric campaign success. A planner must consider operational reach in at least three key areas: sensors, fires, and physical occupation of terrain. His planning needs to provide operational pressure at decisive points, by concentrating superior force (sensors, fires, maneuver forces). In summary, Network-Centric Warfare has dramatically affected operational design. Operational reach and lines of operation have gained additional complexity. Sensor network employment must be considered a key element of operational design, and an integral feature of operational maneuver. By improving the relationships between joint forces in the US operational system, Network-Centric Warfare promises to yield a decisive advantage.

ADA 403832 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)