What started in 1995 as a one year commitment of NATO troops to implement the Dayton peace accord in Bosnia and Herzegovina has developed into a still ongoing mission there since 1996, an additional mission in Kosovo since 1999 and several minor missions in Macedonia since 2001. Still until today about 50,000 troops are stationed in the successor states of former Yugoslavia. To decide to withdraw militarily is a political decision, which will be based on the success achieved politically. To get a better understanding of this process it is necessary to understand the new security environment in the 1990s and its impact on how organizations, especially the United Nations and the Alliance, have had to change their understanding of each others roles and responsibilities and how the states involved in this process influenced it by translating domestic policies into foreign relationships and power projections. To understand why decisions have been made always requires viewing them in their historical context and taking into consideration the back-ground of acting persons and institutions as well. To achieve a stable situation in post conflict situations as for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo Clausewitz's theory helps to develop a common understanding of what has to be achieved to establish a stable and well balanced end state. Clausewitz's term of center of gravity helps to focus all efforts to achieve ones own goals. For the Balkans the desired end state can be defined as 'a stable region aimed at economic integration and security cooperation with sovereign states who guarantee sovereign political decisions of democratically elected governments, based on respect of human rights, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and which refrain from using force against other states and from using violence against their own people or ethnic minorities.' NATO's troops have fulfilled their initial missions. What is missing, are complementary results of all the other organizations involved. This does not mean that SFOR and KFOR can leave, since the paradox situation on the ground implies that they have to further on have to secure the environment. But that the same foreign and defense ministers - and on an occasionally basis the Heads of State and Government - of NATO who several times prolonged the deployments of their troops should develop greater pressure on their own governments as well as on the organizations involved in the peace process to provide the necessary means to foster the political processes in the successor states in former Yugoslavia. The recommendations concerning future involvement of NATO in the successor states of former Yugoslavia are twofold. Without doubt the Alliance has proven its value in providing political and military assistance to end the wars and install a secure environment. The political weight as a transatlantic alliance should be used to increase the pressure on the other organizations involved to proceed with their work and it should be made clear that NATO presence on the ground must be reduced to the smallest extent possible to get troops and capabilities free for other more pressing issues on the international agenda. During this reshaping and restructuring process all mission changes, which - at the time when they occurred - were appropriate to successful implement the peace process should be reviewed, and wherever appropriate be cut back to the basic functions. NATO's military forces will have to face a longer commitment in the region since they are so far the only guarantee for a peaceful settlement and all political developments are relying on the secure environment they provide. But the focus has to shift. The centers of gravity, the governments of the successor states, are purely political. To get them to work or function is not the mission of military forces. Any exit strategy for NATO will have to take this into consideration. It should be accepted that this will take its time.

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