Today, the developing global economy, the revolution in information technologies, and other advances of technology have added new dimensions to the homeland security paradigm. Recent events both at home and abroad, and especially the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have demonstrated the emergence of this current complex threat situation and highlight America's growing vulnerability in the domestic arena. The seriousness of this latest incident beckons one to ask what steps the U.S. government should take to prevent future tragedies like these from happening. While the FBI and FEMA have lead agency responsibilities for crisis management and consequence management, respectively, many suggest an increased role for DOD in homeland security-especially Army units-who have the forces most capable of responding to biological and chemical terrorism, possibly the Nation's greatest threat. But in terms of responding to homeland emergencies, the Posse Comitatus Act severely limits the involvement of regular military forces during federal emergencies, even when they may be the most adequate organization to respond to such incidences. This monograph examines DOD's role in Homeland Security and the viability of the Posse Comitatus Act when viewed through the rubric of the current threat environment. By exploring DOD's historic role in the defense of the U.S. homeland and the advent of the Posse Comitatus Act-its history, application, and weakening over the last couple of decades-the monograph seeks to determine if regular Armed Forces (and specifically the active Army) should play a more significant role in the homeland security mission. In the monograph, the author acknowledges the significance of the Posse Comitatus Act in American history as an evolution of the Nation's long-standing fear of standing army involvement in domestic affairs, but posits that in today's strategic and domestic environment in the U.S. the Act has limited application or impact. By focusing on changes to the Act brought on by the growth of military involvement in the War on Drugs since the 1980s, and expanding use of military forces in other domestic support operations, the author suggests a growing irrelevance of the Posse Comitatus Act. Then, examining the domestic policy of three allied nations-Israel, Canada, and the United Kingdom-the author shows how these democratic nations have more clearly defined procedures for employment of military forces for domestic security matters, better interagency coordination, and a greater reliance on unity of command during times of crisis. The monograph uses the "FAS" test as evaluation criteria, as proposed in Joint Pub 3.0, Appendix B (The Estimate Process), which assesses the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of strategy to ensure that elements of U.S. national security are not in danger. The author concludes that given the current threat environment, the Posse Comitatus Act is at best a relic in great need of revision. He adds that Posse Comitatus is one of several factors limiting the development and execution of effective homeland defense doctrine in America; a doctrine that must be combined arms, joint, interagency, coalition and multi-dimensional in nature, in order to adequately succeed in defending the homeland today. Amongst several options for change, the author argues that at a minimum, the Act should be revised to facilitate the full use of DOD capabilities for domestic defense in cooperation with other federal agencies. The author also contends that in order to maximize the Nation's ability to prepare for, prevent, deter, and respond to attacks on the homeland, DOD must consider expansion of the Army as part of its transformation efforts by creating dedicated homeland defense forces.

ADA 403866 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)