The Moldovan Transdniester War of 1992 is illustrative of modern day ethno-national violence and yields unique lessons on the role and use of military power in dealing with and resolving such crises. Indecisive and necessary are two words that perhaps best typify the role that the armed forces played in this war. The full spectrum of military operations proved necessary to address this complex dilemma. The conflict provides many insights for developing U. S. Military doctrine and force structure to resolve revolutionary, civil, and insurgent wars. The Moldovan Military did not possess a truly full spectrum force; they were incapable of conducting high intensity tactical assault despite having air supremacy and artillery superiority. A lack of part of the modern combined arms force, tanks and assault guns, in the Moldovan military stymied any effective battalion or brigade level offensive operations. The insurgent Transdniester forces had a small amount of armor from the Russian 14t Army and easily defeated the mechanized infantry and anti-tank defenses of the Moldovans; the defenses were equally ineffective in both built-up areas and open terrain when the Moldovans fought the combined arms forces of the Transdniester. Strategically, both parties in the conflict used all of the instruments of national power with varying success in pursuing their respective goals; neither side was very effective. The Transdniester is not a recognized nation and Moldova has lost control of nearly all of its industrial territory; ethnic unrest escalated rather receded when the military was employed to keep the peace. By examining the history of the region, the nature of ethnic conflict, and the conduct of the Transdniester War three lessons are drawn from this study. First, ethnic violence should be analyzed and addressed as a nationalistic movement by a group that is threatened, is seeking its own identity, and that feels that their ability to self determine is essential. The motivation for this movement is real and it is not ethnicity. Ethnicity is only the banner of the movement, not the cause of the movement. Second, when determining strategy for combating ethnic violence, during the assessment phase, remember that all groups have all the elements of national power at their disposal to varying degrees. International law and international recognition have little bearing on the availability of the instruments of power at the disposal of a group. Also, closely related is the understanding that international laws and conventions have little influence on illegal or unrecognized groups and movements, and the actions of such groups. Third, the ability of military forces to conduct full spectrum operations is essential to supporting national aims when dealing with ethnic conflict. The Transdniester War illustrated that preparedness was equal to full spectrum capabilities at the brigade level; asymmetry is a local tactical phenomena, and deploying forces to react to a crisis requires an ability to execute high intensity tactical assault if the enemy is prepared to defend. The Transdniester War and ethnic violence in Moldova are not over. Only an armistice exists to separate forces and prevent a rupture of the temporary peace. Ethnic violence seems routine in the twenty-first century and no new method of resolving ethnic disputes has arisen in the information age.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)