Operations in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 revealed an aspect of military operations that is creating new conditions for operational commanders of land forces in combat theaters. Other United States government agencies are engaged in the same area of operations during decisive operations. Doctrine and practice currently delay meaningful integration of these other government agencies until the transition phase of joint operations. The "War on Terror" has most dramatically highlighted this as the lines between the roles of the Department of Defense (DOD) and variously the Department of Justice, State Department, intelligence agencies and others have become blurred and just as often intertwined. This condition reflects the intentional application of the elements of national power. It results from deliberate direction and coordination at the strategic level of national leadership. Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the regional combatant command headquarters may be sufficient at times when other government agencies have the lead role. This monograph asks whether a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD has the lead role. The monograph presents case study analysis of the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama and the 1994 U.S. invasion of Haiti. Each historical case describes the planning, execution, and interagency integration with military operations. Each case is examined according to the criteria of ends, ways, means, and risk to provide insights to answer the research question. Several topics are presented to provide background and frame the problem. A brief introduction to the National Security Council System and DOD interagency doctrine is presented to provide an understanding of the interagency organization and process at the strategic and operational levels. A description of the interagency environment follows to describe the internal and external environment of interagency action, including the nature of the interagency requirements and roles during campaigns and expeditions. A brief discussion of organizational and leadership theory is also offered to provide a framework for making recommendations to the interagency process and organizational design. This monograph recommends a balanced adaptation of the organizational structure, the process, and the leadership model for interagency coordination in concert with military operations. This will allow operational level military commanders to improve the application of all instruments of national power from all of the capable agencies during decisive operations. Applying this balanced approach will ensure a lower operational level headquarters is more effective than the Combatant Command headquarters to coordinate interagency aspects of operations during campaigns and expeditions when the DOD has the lead role.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)