This monograph examines the recent Army trend to emphasize reconnaissance over security and economy of force in US cavalry doctrine and resourcing decisions. Since the late 1980s the Army has deliberately moved towards lighter, more stealth based reconnaissance in its heavy battalions and brigades. This development has recently accelerated with the publication of a new family of manuals by Fort Knox that offer insight into the radically different techniques necessary for success with these formations. Why has the Army moved in this direction, is it the correct decision, what modifications need to be made, and what can we do to make the transition more effectively? Chapter One explores the reasons why this change is happening now, and why it is so difficult to effect dramatic change within the cavalry community. New threats, operational environments, and technology are shaping American ideas on future conflict, and Army and cavalry concepts are along for the ride. Information Age warfare is a big deal in Washington, D.C. at the dawn of the 21st Century, and information is the raw material that drives this new vision of operations. Current Army organizations struggle with reconnaissance, and new concepts are driving improvement and new force organizations to make up the difference. This change imperative is encountering the conservative traditions embodied in the cavalry community and producing friction that delays acceptance of the new focus. Chapter Two and Three examine modern Western cavalry within a wide historical context. The German experience before and during World War II is offered as a case study for a reconnaissance focused force with excellent doctrine that seemed to loose its relevance in the reality of combat. The Germans understood that ground reconnaissance required organic combat power, but this combat power was then utilized in ways specifically denounced by their doctrine, but necessitated by the operational and tactical situation faced by local commanders. The US experience from the Second World War to Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate the challenges associated with attempting to optimize a force for a specific mission. Which set of conditions do you pick to optimize for? The simpler tactical combat of World War II, or counter-insurgency from Vietnam, or both at the same time? What organizations, doctrine, and training worked in the past, and what needed modification once tested by a non-cooperative opponent? Why does US cavalry practice seem to slide naturally away from reconnaissance and towards security and economy of force? Sixty years of combat experience offer some insight to these questions. Chapter Four provides an overview of the current debate within the cavalry community. Training cavalry leaders and experts is problematic; few systems are in place to do so, and then the Army at large does not respect and utilize this unique capability. Solutions are often offered by a wide range of interested parties, many of whom are not qualified to address the problem systematically and dispassionately. Most ideas for improvement focus on new equipment and organizations, better training and employment, or new concepts and doctrine, with very little in the last category. It seems that many of the best minds waste time defending doomed concepts or refining the best MTOE rather than redefining cavalry and its relevance in the information age. Chapter Five presents seven conceptual principles of cavalry distilled from this study, and a short list of recommendations. US cavalry must embrace reconnaissance as its core competency and focus institutional effort on making this work with the organizations and equipment we have on hand for the immediate future. Appendix A and B offer additional historical case studies and foreign doctrinal examples, including the US in Desert Storm, the French in 1940, and Soviet reconnaissance doctrine from the late Cold War.

ADA429354 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)