The creation of USNORTHCOM in 2002 was a clear indication that the security environment in North America had undergone a radical transformation. Canada and the United States have a history of bi-national mutual defense arrangements spanning more than sixty years. This monograph examines the Canadian Forces operational ability to meet the challenges of this new security environment. The specific vehicle that we used to assess the Canadian Forces operational capability was the Canadian Forces response to the 1997 Red River Flood. The 1997 Red River Flood proves to be an interesting case study because it allows us to compare the respective military responses of both Canada and the U.S. to a disaster. Although we chose a disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operation as our vehicle for comparison, we contend that the operational level response of the Canadian Forces, and particularly the Army, is indicative of the military response we could expect for other disasters. Our case study reveals that by comparison the Canadian Forces had serious operational shortcomings in 1997. Both the subject and the case study are germane because, at the time of writing, a Canada/U.S. bi-national planning group is working in Colorado Springs to determine how both nations can assist each other militarily in the event of a disaster. We conclude that the operational level shortcomings experienced by the Canadian Forces in 1997 are primarily the result of the force reductions and budget cuts laid out in Canada 's 1994 Defence White Paper. Our examination reveals that the same shortcomings identified in Canada 's defense policy are incorporated in the Canadian Forces operational level joint and army doctrines. We conclude that the Canadian Forces operational level shortcomings demonstrated in 1997 are extant. We recommend that the Canadian Forces use the creation of USNORTHCOM, and the radical change to the North American Security environment that it signifies, as the rationale for justifying the requisite resources to rectify its operational level shortcomings. Simply put, in 1994 the Cold War was over and there was no specific threat that justified the level of defense expenditure of the previous decade. In 2004, there is a specific threat to North America and specifically to Canada 's close friend, trading partner and ally - the United States. USNORTHCOM is tangible proof that the U.S. is prepared to meet that threat. Canada would be ill advised to ignore this proof. The bi-national planning group is also tangible evidence that Canada is preparing itself to operate in the new security environment but we find that this step alone is insufficient. We recommend that Canadian doctrine be amended to provide quantifiable measures of effectiveness for the conduct of operations. We recommend that operational level training be conducted to prepare the Canadian Forces and the Army to perform the disaster relief and humanitarian assistance tasks demanded of them by the Government. We recommend that the role of Canada 's Reserve Forces be reexamined to determine if they can perform economy of force operations domestically. Finally, we recommend that use of force training be conducted, on a regular basis, for all soldiers who could be called upon to conduct domestic operations.

ADA429290 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)