Effective operational transitions are crucial for success, but recent interventions indicate that U.S. forces, and the Army in particular, struggle with planning and executing the transition to post-combat operations. By developing and applying a general model for transitions, this study shows that many of the problems associated with post-combat transitions originate from a failure to apply some basic concepts concerning transitions. This monograph develops a general model for transitions using Organizational Development concepts that consists of four inter-related aspects. First, organizations must have a clear and accurate picture of the present (pre-change) state. Second, organizations must have a clear understanding of the desired future (post-change) state. Three, organizations must understand and be able to identify the conditions indicating the need to transition. And four, organizations must develop a plan for managing the transition state. This general model for transitions highlights the similarities between all types of transitions, and underscores the idea that all effective transitions, regardless of when they occur in a campaign, follow the same general principles. Difficulties in post-combat transitions often result from a failure to follow these ideas. Two historical case studies, Operation DESERT STORM and Operation JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY, explore different aspects of transitions. The conclusion is that effective transitions result from having the right capability in the right place at the right time to immediately dominate the situation. The historical case studies illustrate the important role of doctrine, and indicate that U.S. forces will continue to have difficulty transitioning to post-combat operations as long as there is a lack of valid post-combat doctrine to guide planning. It offers several principles to guide planning and execution. First, commanders must adequately resource the planning and preparation efforts for the post-change state in order to facilitate and effective transition. Second, the post-change state planning must be thoroughly integrated with pre-change state planning. Third, the appropriate forces for the post-change phase, in terms of capabilities and size, must be in place to immediately begin operations in order to reduce the time and impact of the transition period.

ADA429016 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)