The construct for predictive analysis is based on the unfounded assumption that technologies and sound analysis will dissipate uncertainty in war. U.S. military doctrine shows an expectation for prediction from the intelligence process; it assumes that prediction is possible, and details a methodology to achieve predictive results. However, this methodology is based on assumptions that presuppose an adversary with a developed doctrine or well-developed patterns of operation. Given that predictive analysis is based largely on knowledge of cyclical patterns in the form of doctrine or established procedures, current U.S. military analytical methods are at odds with the existing geo-political environment. Predictive analysis may still have its place - against a well-known, conventional peer competitor, or against a more unconventional foe who falls into recognizable patterns over time. Still, research suggests that predictive analysis is not feasible for operations in the COE due to the environment 's discontinuous nature, inherent unpredictability, and the resultant level of risk to the friendly force as adversaries make the attainment of surprise a priority. The U.S. military is in need of an alternative method of intelligence - one that does not rely on prediction (and its subsequent reactive approach and risk of surprise) but rather one that works within the realm of uncertainty and seeks to disable the enemy as an effective fighting organization, retaining initiative with the friendly force. Doctrine should give commanders and analysts the freedom to focus on enemy capabilities rather than intentions by removing the doctrinal requirement for prediction of enemy courses of action in probable order of adoption and developing a new intelligence methodology. A modified form of the descriptive method of analysis would be such a method, resolving the dichotomy between the unpredictable nature of the environment and the requirement for predictive results from intelligence. In order to establish a baseline understanding of the various theories as to the relationship between intelligence and maneuver, the monograph examines the three primary modern schools of thought on intelligence methods and their uses of prediction. With this theoretical understanding of the range of possible relationships between intelligence, prediction, and maneuver, the monograph explores the nature of the contemporary operating environment, and aspects of unpredictability within the environment. The monograph then returns to the concept of prediction, using the earlier theoretical basis and understanding of the contemporary operating environment to examine how uncertainty in general, and human behavior in particular, makes successful prediction in war unlikely, and increases risk for the friendly command. With that understanding of the dangers of prediction, the monograph examines the expectations for prediction in U.S. military doctrine, showing how the doctrinal requirements for prediction are subject to high levels of uncertainty. The monograph concludes with the judgment that predictive analysis is not feasible in the COE due to the inherent risk of deception and surprise associated with prediction. The monograph includes proposed changes to the JIPB process and the planning methodology that transform intelligence from a driver of maneuver to a protector of it.

ADA429317 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)