A comparative qualitative analysis of the United States' strategic ends and ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. The research focuses on the motives and driving forces that cause specific regimes to seek nuclear weapons and what strategies have been effective in forcing denuclearization in the past. The main argument provides evidence from historical and theoretical perspectives that the primary determinant of the question to pursue and maintain a nuclear weapons program is a function of regime security, not state security. To induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, the United States would have to develop a mechanism to influence the Kim regime to believe that the decision to denuclearize will increase rather than decrease regime security. The findings of this thesis examine the ways that could be used to achieve this strategic end as well as other less ambitious ends that could work to reduce the threat of a nuclear North Korea.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)