After nearly 20 years of focusing on counterinsurgency, the U.S. Army is returning to a focus on large-scale combat operations. In its effort to regain dominance within the land domain, the Army has identified deep sensing as a current capability gap. This study focuses on the tactical deep sensing necessary for a division to shape its deep area effectively. Since the Army transitioned to a brigade-centric force in the early 2000s, a gap has developed in a division's ability to sense within its deep area. This gap is a result of the divestiture and realignment of both technical and human sensing capabilities away from the division. However, for a division to effectively shape the fight for its brigade combat teams, it must be able to sense within its deep area. This paper will explore how a human sensing capability can contribute to closing the division deep sensing gap. This paper concludes that a human sensing capability can help narrow a division's deep sensing gap by providing the division commander with time, space, and flexibility in developing and executing operations. This contribution primarily comes from a human sensor's ability to provide an increased situational understanding of the enemy's dispositions, composition, and course of action. For this to happen, a U.S. division in a future large-scale combat operation must: have its own dedicated human sensing capabilities that can collect within the division deep area, employ its technical and human sensing capabilities in a coordinated and complementary way, and seek to leverage all human sensing capabilities within its deep area to include Special Operations Forces and inter-agency elements.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)