Since 2001, the United States has been continually engaged in combat operations against an enemy that is elusive and tactically lethal but utterly incapable of affecting operational-level communications. The same cannot be said about China or Russia. In modern joint air operations doctrine, the ATO enables centralized control and connects the operational and tactical levels of war through ATO dissemination. This study assesses whether the joint air operations team is prepared to mitigate the effects of operational-level communications degradation, disruption, or denial on the JFACC's ability to execute centralized control. This study utilizes the lessons from ATO dissemination challenges during the Persian Gulf War and Operation Allied Force, combined with a thorough assessment of three decades of air operations doctrine and training. This study concludes that while JAOCs likely have an ATO dissemination PACE plan, tactical units are neither aware of the plan, nor do they train to it. Furthermore, this lack of preparedness cannot be overcome through problem-solving and innovation against an enemy capable of contesting every domain. Regular and realistic training that connects the operational and tactical levels of war in a highly contested environment is required.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)