During the Global War on Terror, the United States relied heavily on Special Operations in order to achieve operational and strategic objectives globally. This phenomenon changes somewhat when the nation engages in Large Scale Combat Operations. Maintaining appropriate criteria for planning or accomplishing special operations, or committing special operations forces, becomes vitally important to achieve operational or strategic objectives, and to maintain force readiness and optimal capability. By examining four historical case studies of special operations against the backdrop of Large Scale Combat Operations, this research study determines under what conditions and based on what principles special operations may be employed in order to optimize operational success. Using a combination of principles established by joint doctrine and military theorists, the Jedburgh and Chindit operations along with the Doolittle Tokyo and Vermork Norway raids are qualitatively compared in order to offer conclusions on the effectiveness of special operations.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)