While the United States Army's artillery branch transitioned to fight a counter-insurgency fight for over 15 years, other militaries' artillery arms were in a transition as well. The use of U.S. artillery was limited in the conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia fought in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine, all using artillery, the so called 'god of war,' as the centerpiece of their tactical and operational approach. Russia used lessons learned from each of these conflicts as well as the United States' conflicts in adapting their use of artillery. This thesis is a comparative study of Russian cannon artillery from 2000 to 2016, and what the United States Army, and more precisely, the artillery community of the United States Army, should learn from what the Russians implemented. Although this generation of warfare is perceived as new, the use of artillery on the battlefield remains relatively unchanged.

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