In this study the research problem was to identify specific psychological operations (PSYOP) feedback indicators of effectiveness applicable at the U.S. Army division level in the Vietnam-type conflict. The purpose of the study was to contribute towards filling what was believed to be a gap in the existing guidance and doctrine available to PSYOP personnel in the field at the tactical unit level. The scope of the study was limited to U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam during the period 1965-69 operating within the political, economic, and military constraints characterized by that time-frame. This study was conducted following the principles and techniques of systems analysis combined with case studies, surveys, and documentary research. Primary and secondary reference material and data were gathered from essentially two general areas: (1) case studies of the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam, and (2) a survey of selected student officers in the 1968-69 class of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The latter group was selected on the basis of having had combat experience associated with U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam. From these two general batches of data, thirty-seven different PSYOP indicators of effective¬ness were identified. Upon identification of the PSYOP indicators resulting from the division case studies and the CGSC survey, the indicators were arranged and collated according to central tendencies or mutual patterns of support. It was found that the specific indicators could be grouped into six general categories of PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness. Of the six general categories of indicators, statistical data concerning the numbers and frequencies of defectors coming over from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army to the allied forces under the Vietnamese Government "Chieu Hoi" or amnesty program was found to be the most widely utilized indicator at the division level. Following Chieu Hoi statistics, the next most generally mentioned category of indicators was intelligence gained through interrogation of various groups from the Vietnamese populace. These groups included Hoi Chanhs (ralliers), Vietnamese personnel participating in the Volunteer Informant Program, prisoners of war, detainees, and others. The other major categories of PSYOP indicators of effectiveness that were identified included the following: (1) intelligence from captured enemy documents and intercepted messages, (2) direct observations by PSYOP teams, U.S. troops, province/district advisors, and Vietnamese Government officials, (3) enemy counteractions (indirect indicators), and (4) a wide variety of miscellaneous indicators. Sufficient numbers of indicators were identified, collated, compared, and tested against stated parameters and existing doctrine, to provide commanders and staff officers with various options for evaluating PSYOP effort. It was determined that these indicators can be presented to some degree in quantitative or statistical format. The indicators, when combined with experience factors and subjective judgment, provide a means for reporting PSYOP effectiveness and results to the division commander, key staff officers, important official visitors, and to higher headquarters. This study also suggested related areas within psychological operations that should prove fruitful for additional research. These include research projects such as: (1) in-depth PSYOP case studies of each U.S. Army division in Vietnam conducted by on-site investigative teams, (2) an expansion of the scope of the PSYOP survey among future classes at the Command and General Staff College, and (3) controlled PSYOP experiments at the tactical level in Vietnam.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)