Since 1 January 2000, the United States (US) military has conducted 50 operations for which it has approved the Humanitarian Service Medal. During these operations intelligence personnel provide critical information such as which areas are affected and in what way, where refugees are gathering, or which areas can be reached by truck and which areas require relief by the limited helicopter assets. While not at the forefront of the capabilities requested during a humanitarian crisis, intelligence assets provide the situational awareness required by planners to coordinate an effective response, especially during early stages. Humanitarian operation reports as far back as 1949 emphasize the difficulties commanders faced due to a lack of intelligence during the initial response to a humanitarian crisis. Fifty-seven years later, the same issue remained unresolved. Does intelligence training prepare intelligence leaders to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)? What do common intelligence challenges or successes during recent humanitarian operations indicate about ways in which intelligence training can be improved? These questions, among others, will be explored in order to support or refute the assertion that joint intelligence training should be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?

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