This paper explores the operational and strategic effects of the 2007 Iraq Surge on tactical units using Task Force 4-31 IN as a case study. By mid-2006, Iraq was moving toward Civil War promoting a change of strategy. President George Bush announced the reimagined strategy in January 2007 sending General David Petraeus to oversee operations in Iraq. By the time Petraeus left Iraq 18 months later, the security situation in Iraq had improved significantly and there was hope for political reconciliation. Task Force 4-31 IN deployed to Iraq for 15 months, splitting their tour evenly between General Petraeus' tour and that of his predecessor General George Casey. Thus, the unit provides a natural study in the differences between the two. This allows for analysis on what effect the new leadership of Petraeus and his corps commander, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno had on the unit. Task Force 4-31 IN achieved security gains under Petraeus that it had not under Casey despite employing recognized counterinsurgency techniques throughout. This study explores why this was the case and demonstrates the importance of all three levels of war: tactical, operational and strategic in the achievement of meaningful military outcomes.

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