In 1941, the Far East Air Force (FEAF) was activated in support of Operation Philippines-Luzon-Unaccompanied-Manila (Plum). The mission was to deter Japanese aggression by presence and, if ordered, conduct offensive operations against the Japanese. However, following the attacks on Clark Airfield, the FEAF lost 50 percent of their aircraft in a single day. Two weeks later, the remaining offensive aircraft retreated to Australia, unable to deter the Japanese. Under the new leadership of General George Kenney, the FEAF turned their retreat into a offense supporting General Douglas MacArthur's "triphibious concept." By September 1944, the FEAF was striking the Japanese on the Philippines. The research question presented in this thesis is, how effective the FEAF was in shaping and supporting ground operations in the retaking of the Philippines in 1944? Air superiority is a requirement in any area of responsibility; however, the thesis focuses on shaping and supporting operations by means of counterland and airlift operations, both direct and indirect. The thesis is taken from a operational lens and compares the operations on Leyte and Luzon up until March 1945. The secondary question compares the historical significant of Kenney's operations with today's land based aviation challenges in the Pacific.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)