The Army assumed risk in 2003 when it divested all but two short-range air defense battalions and invested in the air defense and airspace management (ADAM) cell. The role of the ADAM cell is to provide a common airspace operating picture, encompasing early warning, management of airspace and planning for aviation and air and missile defense. Central to a functioning ADAM cell is the officer in charge (OIC). The manning and training of the ADAM cell OIC has been the most troubled area of the ADAM cell staff. This study assesses how the Air Defense branch trains and prepares junior company-grade officers to fulfill the role of ADAM Cell OIC. Utilizing the Army design methodology, the study compares the current training and performance of Air Defense officers to the desired end state as defined by current doctrine. The study identifies four issues that stifle progress towards the Army's desired end state. As a result, the study invalidates the need for an ADAM cell OIC because of the tremendous cost in time, training, doctrinal adjustments and capability development required to achieve the desired capability of the ADAM cell OIC.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)